Understanding The Russian Virus, with special reference to Latin America by Calvo, Guillermo A.
1
UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIAN VIRUS
with special reference to Latin America
by Guillermo A. Calvo1
October 13, 1998
I.  Introduction
Although Tequila and Asian crises took the world by surprise and had global
repercussions, after a short while financial turmoil remained somewhat regionally
confined.  Tequila crisis started in Mexico and claimed Argentina as a victim, but the rest
of the world was virtually unscathed.  Similarly, the Asian crisis began in Thailand and
spread all over Asia but did not cause major capital outflows in Latin America. Advanced
economies’ financial sectors were little touched by either.
Early results, however, strongly suggest that the recent Russian crisis may have
more serious implications. Negative effects seem deeper, credit to emerging markets
economies, EMs, has frozen, and a major recession in those economies is becoming more
likely. Why?  This is the central issue addressed in the present note.
I will argue that the world capital market is populated by essentially two types of
investors: informed, and non-informed (or less-informed).  As a general rule, the former
lead and the latter follow, and there is no major difference of opinion between the two
groups.  This system works reasonably well as long as there is no need for one group to
carry out a significant portfolio recomposition.  For, in that case, one group will have to
sell and the other buy.  This is precisely what, in my view, happened after Russia’s debt
repudiation:  the capital loss suffered by Russia’s bond holders, triggered ‘margin calls’
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on highly leveraged informed investors, forcing them to sell some of their EM holdings
to the other group, i.e., the non-informed (for whom leveraging was less attractive due to
their poorer information).  This is a complicated operation because the informed
investors’ sellout makes the non-informed think that there must be some fundamental
problem with EMs.  As a result, EM security prices drop by more than can be accounted
for by conventional fundamentals.  This is key for the explanation offered in this note.
Moreover, since informed investors are liquidity-constrained, EM security prices
will be slow to recover, which implies that EMs may face sharply higher interest rates for
an extended period of time.  This is the link with the real sector.  The resulting fall in
aggregate demand (which has a large unanticipated component) lowers output and
employment through different channels.  The note highlights the sudden change in the
relative price of nontradables caused by contraction in aggregate demand.  A typical
example is a sharp fall in real estate prices.  This, in turn, increases the share of
nonperforming loans and arrears, seriously damaging the domestic credit market.  The
note argues that, if financial turmoil is not quickly turned around, it may interfere with
production and cause a negative output shock.  Afterwards, EMs would fail to recover
even if the informed investors are no longer liquidity-constrained.
 The paper contains a brief methodological comment on the role of short-term debt
obligations in aggravating the crisis, and closes with a few observations about the
difference between Tequila and Russian crises, and prospects for an early recovery.
II.  Information Costs, Specialist Clusters, and Leveraging
I start from the observation that EMs’ risk assessment is subject to large fixed
costs.  This is so because no investment project can be effectively evaluated without
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taking into account the macroeconomic environment (a fixed cost).  In addition, EMs’
macroeconomic analysis is especially costly as it has to be carried out in a milieu of  poor
and rapidly obsolete information—the latter stemming from the fact that many of these
economies are undergoing still uncertain but deep political/economic reforms.  This, in
turn, naturally leads to the formation of  specialist clusters.  The  latter are groups of
high-power macroeconomists and financial experts who can quickly evaluate new
information, and effectively disseminate it across the clusters’ clients, e.g., institutional
investors, hedge funds, etc.2
 The above-average information enjoyed by these investors (which I call informed
investors) makes it attractive for them to finance their long positions in EM instruments
by borrowing and short selling safe assets (e.g., US T Bills)—in other words, leveraging.
Thus, an exogenous and unexpected negative shock, like Russia’s debt repudiation, will
lower informed investors’ portfolio values and, in turn, trigger ma gin calls, i.e., instant
debt repayment obligations on leveraged positions
In an ideal perfect-information world, eleveraging associated with the collapse of a
very small share of world’s financial portfolio (as Russian debt is), should not result in an
across-the-board implosion of EM markets.  This implication, however, is not valid if
informed investors were liquidity-constrained.  Under those circumstances, new EM debt
instruments, for example, would have to be acquired by non-informed investors.3 This
may bring about a major disturbance in the capital market, as I will explain.  For the sake
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of exposition, I will analyze each of the following increasingly realistic situations: (a)
initially, non-informed hold no EM paper, (b) they do, and (c) the non-informed keep
track of informed investors’ strategies (this is the most interesting and, I believe, relevant
case).
a. Non-informed hold no EM paper.  In this case non-informed investors’ reservation
price would be below the market’s, implying that for them to be willing to take EM
debt, its price must take a dip.  This extreme case helps to illustrate how prices can
plunge beyond what would be called by (conventional) fundamentals.  However, the
example is not realistic because there are, for example, open-end EM mutual funds
especially designed for the non-informed small investor.  Therefore, one should pay
attention to the case in which, initially, holders of EM securities involved both
informed and non-informed investors.
b. Informed and non-informed hold EM paper.  The informed investors’ sellout will
bring about a fall in the price of EM debt.  This is so because the non-informed will
end up holding a larger share of EM paper. However, for the fall to be significantly
large, one would have to argue that initially the non-informed held a tiny fraction of
EM securities, or that their risk assessment or risk aversion was much larger than that
of informed investors.  This may very well be the case, but I will now offer what
seems to me a more relevant explanation.
c. The information set of non-informed includes the informed investors’ actions.   Non-
informed investors are not completely in the dark.  They read Barron’s and the Wall
Street Journal and, thus, follow the informed investors’ opinions and actions, albeit at
a distance and with a lag.  In particular, the non-informed will not be indifferent to the
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fact that liquidity-constrained informed investors stay out of the market for new EM
debt, for example.4  Thus, the non-informed face what is sometimes called a signal-
extraction problem: do the informed investors stay out because they are liquidity-
constrained, or because they know something bad about these countries that I don’t
know?  It seems to me plausible that, upon observing that the informed stay out of the
market for new EM issues, the non-informed will attach some probability that the
EMs have been hit by a negative—albeit unobserved—across-the-board  shock.  This
would lead them to lower their assessments for all EMs, causing a sudden market
value loss for all EM debt.  Furthermore, as informed investors realize that their
actions are closely watched by the non-informed (bringing about a sudden across-the-
board fall in prices), they will have a strong incentive to dump their EM securities
holdings before the non-informed have time to react.  However, in order for the
informed to be able to sell as a group, they must find buyers among the non-
informed.  In the realistic case in which the non-informed take this dumping by the
informed as a strong signal that there are fundamental problems with all the EMs, the
sellout will increase further.  This is so because the informed investors’ dumping
would go far beyond what is necessary to meet the margin calls associated with the
Russian shock.5  Thus, depending on how the non-informed revise their expectations
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in light of these developments, one might even conceive of situations in which the
market for new EM debt obligations freezes up completely.6
IV.  Sudden Stop and Meltdown
The collapse of the EM bond market results in sharply higher interest rates and a
sudden stop or reversal of capital inflows (sudden stop, SS, for short).  By national
accounting, and abstracting from errors and omissions, capital inflows equal current
account deficit plus accumulation of international reserves.  Therefore, SS has to be met
by reserves losses or lower current account deficits.  In practice, both take place.  While a
loss of international reserves increases the country’s financial vulnerability, contractions
in the current account deficit usually have serious effects on production and employment.
To see this, note that, by national accounting, the current account deficit equals
aggregate demand minus GNP.  Thus, a sudden contraction in the current account deficit
is likely to lead to a sharp decline in aggregate demand (the only exception being the
unlikely case in which there is an offsetting increase in GNP).  The latter, in turn, lowers
the demand for tradables and nontradables.  The excess supply of tradables thus created
can be shipped abroad, but the nontradables are, by definition, bottled up at home and,
thus, its relative price will have to fall (resulting in a real depreciation of the currency).
A typical example, is real estate prices that have collapsed in all recent crises.
How does one go from here to infer a loss of output and employment?  I can
identify two channels: (1) Keynesian, and (2) Fisherian (for Irving Fisher, the Yale
economist).  The Keynesian channel is straightforward and familiar:  prices/wages are
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downward inflexible; thus, a fall in aggregate demand is accommodated by a fall in
output and employment.
On the other hand, the Fisherian channel is less familiar but, in my view,
potentially more fearsome.  Financial contracts are, as a general rule, very simple.  An
example are bank loans, which oblige the borrower to pay a fixed number of installments.
Consider, first, a stable price level situation.  In that situation, nontradables’ prices must
fall for their relative price to decline.  Thus, the ex post real interest rises, increasing the
amount of nonperforming loans.  This problem may be less acute if the currency is
devalued.  However, there are two common complications that may offset the positive
effects of devaluation.  First, many EMs are heavily dollarized, in which case devaluation
is ineffective.  Moreover, even in countries where assets dollarization is not significant
(Chile, Indonesia), there exists sizable liabilities dollarization.  It is well known, for
example, that Indonesia’s private sector had a sizable external debt when crisis hit, and
that this type of debt played a key role in the ensuing financial difficulties.  Second, even
if there is no dollarization to speak of, bank loans, for instance, are of shorter maturity
than the underlying productive projects.  Therefore, interest rates are likely to be revised
upward after the SS, reflecting credit market conditions, again increasing the incidence of
nonperforming loans.  The Fisherian channel is more fearsome because it damages the
financial sector.  As a result, banks become more cautious and cut their loans, especially
to small- and medium-sized firms, interenterprise and trade credit dry up, possibly
leading to a major recession.7
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As discussed in Calvo (op.cit.), once the real side of the economy is hit, the
damage may not be cured with standard monetary or fiscal policy.  This is so because the
damage may be equivalent to a negative supply shock which lowers physical capital’s
marginal productivity.  Therefore, EMs become less attractive investment options, and
the combination “low growth-high unemployment” may linger on for a long time.  Even
if the informed investors grab hold of their initial liquidity, they will now have lower
incentives to go back to EMs.
V.  Aggravating Factor: Short Term Debt Obligations
If there is no debt or debt obligations are nil in the near future, then a SS can at
most force the current account deficit down to zero, i.e., the country as a whole can at
worst be denied fresh money.  In contrast, if international credit dries up and debt
obligations (interest plus amortization) are large, the economy may need to generate
sizable current account surpluses or declare a debt moratorium (as Mexico in 1982) or
repudiate (Russia 1998)—deepening the negative effects of SS.
To illustrate the relevance of short-term debt obligations, Chart 1 shows potential
public sector debt service as a share of international reserves for several Latin American
countries.  Potential debt service is defined as interest plus amortization coming due on a
given year assuming no debt rollover.  Debt obligations include both domestic and
external public debt and are expressed in dollars, using as a deflator the year’s average
exchange rate.  Needless to say, these estimates can be improved and should only be
taken as a first pass at these issues.   On this basis, however, Brazil shows, by far, the
highest ratio.  With a stable exchange rate (which the government has promised to keep),
less than one-fifth of Brazil’s potential debt service could be honored by totally depleting
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international reserves.  Four-fiths would, thus, have to come from a reduction in the
current account deficit.8  Therefore, if potential debt service were 20 percent of GDP (it is
actually larger), the current account deficit would have to contract by 16 percent of GDP,
an enormous amount.9  The situation is less critical in Mexico, and Chile could finance its
entire public debt service obligations by running down its reserves.  The ratio for
Argentina is a bit misleading because the central bank has to keep a large share of its
reserves as backing for base money.  Thus, for example, if no reserves could be utilized
for servicing the public debt, the current account deficit would have to contract between 3
and 4 percentage points of GDP.  This is a large number for Argentina given the
sensitivity shown in 1995 to a smaller reduction in the current account deficit (see note
9).10
VI. Final Words
Previous analysis suggests that the virulence of the Russian shock stems from
capital market failure.  The shock hit the better-informed segment of the market and,
thus, left pricing of EM securities in the hands of (what the note calls) non-informed
investors.  Problems are compounded when such investors interpret the liquidity-
motivated sellout by informed investors as indication that the countries themselves are
undergoing serious difficulties in their fundamentals.  It is still too early to assess the full
relevance of this conjecture.  However, the high correlation across EM bond prices, given
the absence of easily identifiable common country shocks, makes me confident that,
                                                          
8 To avoid misunderstandings, it should be kept in mind that I am computing potential capital outflows, but
I am saying nothing about their likelihood.  In fact, some analysts suggest that a run on this debt is unlikely
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9 During the Tequila episode in 1995, the current account deficits contracted in about 8 percent of GDP in
Mexico, and about 2.5 percent in Argentina; in turn, GDP fell by more than 6 percent in Mexico and more
than 4 percent in Argentina.
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whatever the right explanation might be, the answer must lie in the workings of the
capital market itself.
Why was Tequila so much less virulent?  The salient difference between Tequila
and Russian crises is that in the Mexican crisis bondholders came out whole, while in
Russia they were wiped out.  Shareholders got badly hit in both instances, though.  Thus,
if the arguments developed here apply to all EM securities, a complete answer would still
have to wait for further quantitative analysis.  However, I suspect that there is an
important difference between stocks and bonds in this respect.  Just a cursory look at EM
stock markets reveals a high degree of volatility.  This is especially true in Latin America
where booms led in some cases to more than quadrupling market values, followed by
meltdowns in which stock prices were cut in half in the span of a few weeks.  Thus, it
seems unlikely that informed investors strongly leveraged their Latin American long
stock positions.  The situation is, of course, different with fixed-income instruments,
especially short-term debt, which can be held until maturity and, hence, price volatility
becomes less of an issue.  Thus, I would expect leveraging to be more prevalent in the
bond market.
Consequently, with the above discussion as background, I feel confident to offer
the following conjecture:  Russia’s crisis was more virulent than Mexico’s crisis because
fixed-income holders (especially informed investors) were wiped out in the former, but
came out unscathed in the latter.  This perspective also helps to evaluate the possible
consequences of debt repudiation in Brazil.  Word of mouth has it that informed investors
are out of that market, and that the main holders are Brazilian institutions for which those
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instruments are attractive substitutes for domestic money.  Thus, in the first place, a
massive run on those bonds is less likely because the private sector needs transactions
balances for its daily operations.  And, second, the absence of informed investors in the
Brazilian debt market may keep the effects of debt repudiation from spreading beyond
regional confines.
What is reasonable to expect next?  Available information suggests that the
liquidity crunch may still claim more victims, and that it has already landed in the US.
Thus, I do not foresee a quick reactivation of the EM bond market in the near future.
Countries are, thus, likely to go through a wrenching Sudden Stop process.  This might be
especially painful in Latin America because the region had, until now, benefited from
widening current account deficits.  In this context, crisis in Brazil cannot possibly help
and, if anything, will likely make investors even more jittery.
Can this be prevented?  It is hard to say.  However, a large bailout package for
Brazil should bring calm and confidence.  The package has to be large enough, though.
Otherwise, it could speed up exit and end up in a replay of the Russian crisis (in which
the package was spent almost instantaneously, leaving behind a large stock of yet unpaid
short-term debt).
A parallel line of attack would be further cuts in the US interest rates, although I
would not place a great deal of faith on this.  We are witnessing a non-uniform
deleveraging process: not all segments are hit likewise.  Thus, to become effective,
monetary policy may have to be complemented by direct credit-market enhancements.  In
other words, the world economy could presently be caught in a “liquidity trap” where
extra liquidity does not per se increase spending because of dysfunctional credit markets.
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